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Negligent Misrepresentation: Fraud or
Negligence
June W. Wiener*
A CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT, A, is hired by B, a small,
poorly run business corporation, to audit its books and
present a statement of the financial position of the company. A
is urged to complete the job as quickly as possible. As a result,
A carelessly omits several important items and the statement
falsely reflects a sound financial position. B, relying on the re-
port, decides to expand his business by purchasing a large stock
of highly speculative merchandise. B shows the report to C
who, relying on the report, agrees to extend credit to B. Shortly
thereafter, B becomes bankrupt. Both B and C sue A for neg-
ligent misrepresentation of the financial position of the company.
How can this problem be characterized?' Although there
was no remedy for negligent misrepresentation at common law,
and English law apparently still provides none,2 the American
courts have all, in one way or another, accepted the thesis that
"conscience, fair dealing and the usages of business require" 3
some type of liability. But the nature and limits of that liability
have never been clearly defined by the majority of American
jurisdictions.
The factual situation described above contains two distin-
guishing elements: the defendant is not guilty of an intent to
deceive; the damage to the plaintiffs is purely pecuniary.
Early legal debate revolved around the question of the form
* A.B., Bryn Mawr College; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 For conduct to constitute negligent misrepresentation, there must be an
honest belief in the truth of the statement made. However, the statement
is actually false because defendant has failed to (1) make a careful investi-
gation; (2) use normal business or professional competence in forming a
judgment on data carefully obtained; or (3) use care in communicating the
information. Restatement, Torts § 552 at 122; U. S. v. Garcia & Diaz, Inc.,
291 F. 2d 242 (2d Cir. 1961).
2 Salmond on Torts 502 (11th ed. 1953). "No action lies for pecuniary dam-
age caused by careless statements"; citing Candler v. Crane, Christmas &
Co., 2 K. B. 164 (1951); Paton, Tort Liability, 25 Can. B. J. 133 (1947);
Harper and James, Torts 537 (1956).
3 International Products Co. v. Erie R. Co., 244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E. 662, 663
(1927).
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of the action,4 either deceit or negligence. More recently, some
jurisdictions have eliminated technical procedural distinctions
and formal classification, granting recovery as long as the essen-
tials are established.5 Having deemed the form of the action im-
material "as long as a remedy is provided," Prosser still main-
tains that it is "clearly important . . . that the theory of liability
is one of negligence rather than intent to mislead." 6 And
Harper and James, in discussing the confusion involved in ap-
plying old terms to new concepts, state:
Such loose use of language is not conducive to clarity
and it seems better to confine what the law calls "deceit" to
genuinely fraudulent misrepresentations, treating liability
for nonfraudulent misrepresentations in separate categories. 7
In other words, though the form may be immaterial under
modern forms of pleading, the majority of authors agree it is
essential that the courts recognize the nature of the conduct
giving rise to a cause of action. It is the failure to distinguish be-
tween the theories of fraud and negligence that has led to the
current chaotic state of the law of misrepresentation. In spite of
the urging of numerous text book writers and law professors,
American courts have, by and large, side-stepped the issues. And
it has been some time since any writer has taken a poll of current
attitudes.
The action of deceit is historically a combination of con-
tractual warranty and intentional tort.8 However unlikely or
confusing its origin, its development has centered around the es-
sential element of "scienter" or conscious wrong which, even in
the earliest cases, included the concept of wanton and willful neg-
4 For an interesting discussion see the early debate between Professor Boh-
len and Professor Green: Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence
or Warranty, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 733 (1929); Green, Deceit, 16 Va. L. Rev. 749,
750-762 (1930); Bohlen, Should Negligent Misrepresentation Be Treated As
Negligence or Fraud, 18 Va. L. Rev. 703 (1932); Green, Innocent Misrepre-
sentation, 19 Va. L. Rev. 242 (1933).
5 E.g., N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1283; interpreted in Fayetteville Cemetery
Assn. v. McGarry, 202 Misc. 141, 117 N. Y. S. 2d 63 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga Co.
1953); Maflo Holding Corp. v. S. J. Blume, Inc., 308 N. Y. 570, 127 N. E. 2d
558 (1948). As to Fraud: Kaiser v. Schiess, 82 N. Y. S. 2d 676 (Sup. Ct.
Queens Co. 1948); McCloskey v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 28 Misc. 2d 761,
212 N. Y. S. 2d 828 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1961).
6 Prosser, Law of Torts 543 (2d ed. 1955).
7 Harper and James, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 529. See, as to various adjudi-
cated pleadings, Oleck, Negligence Forms of Pleading 502-540 (1957 re-
vision).
8 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 6 at 522.
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ligence.9 The law early recognized that, although the realities
of the business world demand that those dealing in it practice the
"diligence of self protection," 10 a man cannot protect himself if
the conduct of those with whom he is dealing is designed to pre-
vent him from doing so. For by its nature the element of intent
to deceive implies power over the plaintiff's ability to protect
himself. Although most of the actions brought in deceit involved
business transactions, the elements reflect not only the nature of
the damage (i.e. pecuniary loss), but the intentional nature of
the defendant's conduct. It is primarily this latter consideration
which led to the result of limited liability. Thus, there could be
no liability where this power over the plaintiff's conduct was
lacking. But wherever such control could be found, liability
would lie. Since negligent conduct by definition involves the
breach of a legal duty to use care "with no precise intention of
producing a particular injury," "I the theory of liability as devel-
oped in the action of deceit is ill suited to deal with purely negli-
gent acts. Barring a deliberate attempt to defraud, the plaintiff
is in a position to protect himself. Indeed, he has a duty to do so.
And a duty on the part of defendant to use care is quite different
from a duty to act in good faith.
On the other hand, the concepts of liability in an ordinary
negligence action, developed largely in the field of physical dam-
age to person or property,12 have been deemed too broad to deal
with purely pecuniary interests. 13 Because of this unwillingness
9 It is by way of interpretation of the element of "scienter" that courts have
succeeded in allowing negligence actions to be brought in deceit without
specifically recognizing the nature of the conduct involved. E.g. (1) "Reck-
less disregard" is interpreted as gross negligence: Warman v. Delaney, infra
n. 14. The strict English rule as adopted by N. Y. plus the Restatement
[Torts § 525] defines "reckless" as an absence of genuine belief or the pres-
ence of conscious ignorance of the truth: Salmond on Torts, op. cit. supra
n. 1 § 203 at 691. (2) The N. Y. rule that a statement "susceptible of accu-
rate knowledge" and made "as of defendant's own knowledge." [Kramer v.
Joseph P. Day, Inc., 26 N. Y. S. 2d 734, 737, 80 A. L. R. 2d 1239 n. (Sup. Ct.
N. Y. Co. 1941); Sgarlata v. Carioto, 201 N. Y. S. 2d 384 (City Ct. of Albany
1960) is consistent with the test of conscious misrepresentation. But this
modification has become an exception in jurisdictions where the simple fact
that the statement is susceptible of precise knowledge is-sufficient to infer
intent: Clark v. Haggard, 141 Conn. 668, 109 A. 2d 358 (1954).
10 Harper and James, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 542.
11 Bernstein v. L&H Meat Co., 115 N. Y. S. 2d 175 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1951),
afl'd. 280 App. Div. 914, 115 N. Y. S. 2d 823 (1952).
12 Salmond on Torts, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 501.
13 Seavey, Torts, 34 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 517, 522 (1959); Keeton, Fraud: The
Necessity For An Intent To Deceive, 5 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 583, 599 (1958).
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to extend liability, plus the acknowledgment that some liability
must be imposed, and the already limited liability of the deceit
action, a great number of American jurisdictions have dealt with
the problem by gradually broadening the concept of intent to
include varying degrees of negligence under concepts of "inferred
intent," 14 or other legal fictions. But this approach ignores the
essential nature of the wrong.
By trying to incorporate the law of negligence into the
already well defined law of deceit, confusion is sure to result.
This is especially true in those jurisdictions which, by the use of
fictions, do not recognize the nature of the defendant's conduct
as being negligent rather than intentional. By paying lip service
to the doctrine that intent to deceive is an essential element of
the action and at the same time constantly stretching the concept
to include all types of unintentional conduct, the courts are far
from employing the theory of liability that Prosser says is essen-
tial.15 They are, instead, calling defendants to account for purely
negligent conduct without regard to the existence of a duty of
care. The concept of contributory negligence is emasculated. This
approach has produced inconsistencies, illogical fictions, and
unresolvable conflicts of decisions. 6 The result is that an attor-
ney in these jurisdictions is at a loss to predict what theory of
liability will be employed. There is an equal unpredictability as
to what attitude a reviewing judge may adopt in upholding or
reversing a decision. 17 Irrespective of which form of action is
adopted, it is essential that any approach to the problem of neg-
ligent misrepresentation clearly recognize the real nature of de-
fendant's conduct.
Because the remedy must achieve an equitable balance be-
tween two interests, the unrestrained transaction of business
as opposed to the economic interests of the plaintiff, it must be
14 See Keeton, op. cit. supra n. 13 at 584 ff. 3 as to Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Kentucky, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota.
As to Ohio, Illinois, Connecticut see: Beamer v. Feick, 113 Ohio App. 264,
177 N. E. 2d 691 (1960); Brubaker v. Gould, 34 Ill. App. 2d 421, 180 N. E.
2d 873 (1962): In re Estate of Baumgarth, 23 Ill. App. 2d 319, 326, 163 N. E.
2d 201 (1960); Warman v. Delaney, 148 Conn. 469, 172 A. 2d 188, 189 (1961)
(reckless = gross negligence).
15 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 6.
16 Keeton, op. cit. supra n. 13 at 583, 591, 594.
17 For an interesting example of the confusion that can arise when a tort
action is not well defined: Penn-Ohio Steel Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 15 Misc. 2d 752, 183 N. Y. S. 2d 40 (1958), affd. 7 App. Div. 2d 441, 184
N. Y. S. 2d 58, 187 N. Y. S. 2d 476 (1959).
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flexible, taking into account the realities and customs of the busi-
ness world.
There are a growing number of jurisdictions which have, by
statute or case law, allowed an action in deceit to be brought for
negligent conduct without recourse to legal fictions. Indeed, what
has been consistently described as a minority view' 8 appears to
this author to be the dominating tendency in the field of mis-
representation today, when these jurisdictions are considered
together with those which have accomplished the same result
through the use of inferences.19 However, it is clear that the
distinguishing factual elements of these cases (lack of intent,
pecuniary damage) are most easily dealt with, with a minimum
of confusion, if a separate action in negligence is evolved along
the lines of that developed in New York. The nature of the
conduct involved must be the paramount consideration in choos-
ing which theory of liability is applicable. Further modifications
or limits to liability depend for their rationale on factors outside
18 37 C. J. S. § 25 p. 265; Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 6; Oleck, op. cit. supra
n. 7.
19 No intent required:
By statute:
Alabama: Code (1940) Tit. 7 §§ 108, 109. Barrett v. Hanks, 155 S. 2d 339
(Ala. 1963).
California: Civ. Code § 1710 (2). Gagne v. Bertram, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.
2d 15 (1954).
Oklahoma: 15 Okla. Stat. § 58 (1951). Farrar v. Chitwood, 282 P. 2d 729
(Sup. Ct. Okla. 1955).
Texas: Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 4004. Blanton v. Sherman Compress Co.,
210 S. W. 2d 423 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (As to real property trans-
actions).
Case Law:
Florida: Goodman v. Strassburg, 139 S. 2d 163 (Fla. App. 3rd Dist. 1962).
Kansas: Ware v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 181 Kan. 291, 311 P. 2d
316, 320 (1957).
Michigan: See note 64 infra.
Minnesota: Moulton v. Norton, 184 Minn. 343, 238 N. W. 686 (1931) (as to
vendor).
Nebraska: Dargue v. Chaput, 166 Neb. 69, 80, 88 N. W. 2d 148, 155 (1958).
New Mexico: Ham v. Hart, 58 N. M. 550, 273 P. 2d 748, 749 (1954).
Utah: Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P. 2d 382, 385 (1962). (Makes dis-
tinction between fraud and negligence though apparently not in the
form of the action. Requires special duty of care. No liability for negli-
gence in the manner of expression.)
Virginia: B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Benjamin T. Crump Co., 199 Va. 312,
99 S. E. 2d 606 (1957).
Statutes imposing liability on the grounds of public policy duty (e.g.,
notaries, accountants, or food and drug cases) and dangerous instrumental-
ity concepts all show the trend toward strict liability. This warranty con-
cept dispenses with both duty and intent and further exemplifies the court's
avoidance of the issues. An attempt to put more and more negligence cases
in this category has been resisted to a great extent in New York since the
result is greater liability than that for fraud.
May, 1964
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the issue involved in this choice, that is, the realities of the eco-
nomic world. In establishing a duty of care, reference to what
the ordinary businessman has a right to expect is a normal con-
sideration.
Since the purpose of this article is to analyze the distinguish-
ing element of negligent misrepresentation as distinct from those
where there is an intent to deceive, particular attention will be
directed to New York case law which alone has maintained a
consistently clear distinction.20  Those few jurisdictions which
recognize a cause of action in negligence for the negligent use of
words with resulting pecuniary loss have relied heavily on these
decisions. 21
Determinative Elements
Leading the development of a right of recovery for negligent
language within tort concepts, New York courts, unhampered by
the necessity of fitting the action into an existing doctrine un-
suited to the conduct involved, have recognized, indeed empha-
sized, the need to limit liability far short of the ordinary rule of
foreseeability. In addition, having deliberately set the action
apart as distinct from fraudulent misrepresentation, they refuse
to make liability "coterminous with that of liability for fraud." 22
This effort has centered around the concepts of duty to use care
and contributory negligence, as opposed to intent to induce re-
liance and the right to rely.
The law imposes a general duty of honesty.23 A dishonest
attempt to deceive naturally implies an attempt to prevent plain-
20 Briggs, Blitman & Posner v. N. Y. State Thruway Auth., 28 Misc. 2d 110,
217 N. Y. S. 2d 806 (N. Y. Ct. of Claims 1961). Note: The scope of this article
extends only to a direct action for damages and does not include other rem-
edies such as rescission where it is uniformly held that recovery may be had
for negligent or innocent mistake. As to damages see: Sorensen v. Gardner,
215 Or. 255, 344 P. 2d 471, 476 (1959) (both contract & tort rule of damages
used in fraud action). For an annotated discussion of the question of dam-
ages in a deceit action: Gagne v. Bertran, supra n. 19. For an annotated dis-
cussion of punitive damages in a fraud action: Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N. Y.
2d 401, 179 N. E. 2d 497 (1961). Interest on damage claims: Purcell v. Long
Island Daily Press, 9 N. Y. 2d 255, 173 N. E. 2d 865 (1961). Rule applied in
N. Y.: Terris v. Cummiskey, 11 App. Div. 2d 259, 203 N. Y. S. 2d 445 (1960).
21 E.g., Garapedian v. Anderson, 92 N. H. 390, 31 A. 2d 371 (1943); Weston
v. Brown, 82 N. H. 157, 131 A. 141 (1925); Sult v. Scandrett, 119 Mont. 570,
178 P. 2d 405 (1947); Valdez v. Gonzales, 50 N. M. 281, 176 P. 2d 173 (1946)
(narrow interpretation of Ultramares v. Touche, infra) (Cf., Ham v. Hart,
supra n. 19).
22 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441, 447 (1931).
23 Harper and James, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 542.
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tiff from being on guard, making an independent investigation,
doubting the validity of the representation, in short, colors the
entire relationship of the parties.2 4 Consequently, where intent
is found, liability for false representations will extend to any
plaintiff who can have been mesmerized by defendant's malicious
actions. One need only prove that defendant intended to influ-
ence the transaction in question.25 Whether or not there is a duty
to use care, if the defendant knew or had reason to know that
a particular plaintiff or class of plaintiffs would rely he will be
liable.26 Thus, in Gluck v. Tankel,27 the court found an "abso-
lute" duty of honesty. The misrepresentation involved the price
paid for goods which the court found were susceptible of precise
knowledge. In discussing the relation of the parties (which the
court finally determined to be a fiduciary one although its pre-
cise nature was left in doubt), they held a duty of "utmost integ-
rity . . . throughout all dealings leading up to the formation of"
a contractual relationship. Further, that even if the relationship
were merely vendor to vendee, although the defendant is not
bound to reveal the price paid for goods, if he speaks he must
speak the truth because "a misrepresentation as to cost is natu-
rally calculated to mislead the purchaser." 28 In short, the mere
fact that defendant intended to induce plaintiff to enter the trans-
action was sufficient.
24 "By its very nature a false statement intentionally made is wrongful. If
it inflicts material harm upon another, which was or should have been in
the contemplation of the actor, and it results in actual damage to the Plain-
tiff's economic or legal relationships, an action may lie." (Penn-Ohio Steel
Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., supra n. 17.)
25 Angerosa v. White Co., 248 App. Div. 425, 290 N. Y. S. 204, 213, affd. 275
N. Y. 524, 11 N. E. 2d 325 (1936). Cohen v. Glassman, 110 N. Y. S. 2d 835
N. E. (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1952): "One who commits a fraud is liable to
whoever (sic) suffers by the fraud, regardless of whether there is any
privity (between plaintiff and defendant) . . . ." (Defendant knowingly
misrepresented minimum retail business to broker who, relying on the
representation, lent money to purchaser to complete the sale. Purchaser
became insolvent and therefore could not repay the loan. Broker was
awarded damages!). Du Rite Laundry, Inc., v. Washington Electric Co.,
263 App. Div. 396, 33 N. Y. S. 2d 925, 6 A. L. R. 2d 297 n. (1942). (Contract
between seller and buyer, buyer to accept goods only if found without de-
fect by inspection company hired by buyer. Seller relied on report by
purchasing from manufacturer and delivering to buyer. Buyer suing seller
to rescind because of defective goods. Court allowed seller to interplead
inspection company who would be liable to seller for damages.)
26 Restatement, Torts § 531, p. 71.
27 24 Misc. 2d 841, 199 N. Y. S. 2d 12, aff'd. 12 App. Div. 2d 339, 211 N. Y. S.
2d 602 (1960).
28 199 N. Y. S. 2d 18.
May, 1964
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As was said in Dale System, Inc. v. General Teleradio, Inc.:
One important difference between actions for misrepre-
sentation in deceit and those based upon negligence is that
the class of persons to whom the Defendant may be liable
is considerably more restricted when the basis of liability is
negligence rather than intent or recklessness. 29
In Goodman v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co.80 the court
held defendants liable to vendors relying on an incorrect title
report issued to a prospective buyer on the theory of fraud but
stated they would not be similarly liable in negligence. In Gard-
ner v. Gerstein3l a complaint for fraudulent inducement of a con-
tract was sufficient.
In addition, contributory negligence on the part of a person
who is misled is not a defense against a charge of intentionally
making misleading statements. 32 The Gluck case, discussed
above,83 also held the fact that plaintiff made his own estimate
on the value of the goods did not preclude his reliance on de-
fendant's statement as to cost. In the action of deceit a right to
rely is normally found except where the facts show that the
plaintiff was obviously foolish to rely3 4 or where the plaintiff
made an independent investigation unhampered by the influence
of the defendant. 35 He need not investigate unless he is put on
notice of the falsity of the statement.36 And even where he has
made such an investigation, it will not be a defense if defendant
purposely prevents the investigation from being effective.3 7
In short, where liability is founded on intent, there is no duty
on the part of the plaintiff to use care. But where liability is
29 Dale System v. General Teleradio, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 745 (S. D. N. Y.
1952).
30 11 App. Div. 2d 1003, 206 N. Y. S. 2d 32 (1960).
31 7 App. Div. 2d 631, 179 N. Y. S. 2d 544, aff'd. 6 N. Y. 2d 956, 161 N. E.
2d 225 (1958).
32 Sease v. Central Greyhound Lines of N. Y., 281 App. Div. 192, 118 N. Y.
S. 2d 433, 440 (1952), revd. 306 N. Y. 284, 117 N. E. 2d 899 (1953). Relying
on: Angerosa v. White Co., supra n. 25.
33 Gluck v. Tankel, supra n. 27.
34 Restatement, Torts, § 541.
35 Id. at § 547.
30 Id. at § 540. Clark v. Haggard, 141 Conn. 668, 109 A. 2d 358 (1954).
37 Restatement, Torts, § 547 at 108.
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founded on a relation, the plaintiff must use care because:
An equitable doctrine will not be employed to prevent
the assertion of fraudulent and inequitable conduct.3 8
Where the law of negligence imposes a general duty of care
to avoid injury to the tangible interests of others (personal in-
jury or property damage),39 no such general duty is imposed in
the case of pecuniary loss. This tendency, "abnormal to the gen-
eral law of torts," 40 reflects "the social and economic policies
latent in legal formulae." 41 The law is reluctant to impose liabili-
ties which will hamper efficient and speedy transactions of busi-
ness. It has recognized, in spite of the tendency to modify the
harshness of the rule of caveat emptor, that the interests of
parties to business transactions are naturally adverse. The pri-
mary consideration is what a reasonable businessman has a right
to expect according to customary business practices.4 2 He almost
always has a right to expect that defendant will be honest and
sincere in his representations, but liability hinges in these cases
on whether or not he can demand a certain level of care and
competence. Defendant's intent to influence the transaction is
not enough without some special relationship, contractual or
otherwise, giving rise to a duty of care. This reasonable expecta-
tion of care may arise from the personal relationship of the
parties (e.g., fiduciary, special inducement to rely) or from the
nature of the transaction (e.g., public responsibility, expert
knowledge, knowledge in the exclusive possession of defendant).
Knowledge that the plaintiff will rely is always essential.
Although some jurisdictions have limited the action for neg-
ligent misrepresentation for pecuniary loss to those in privity,43
the New York law does not depend upon such a narrow concept.
38 Crowell-Collier Pub. Co. v. Josefowitz, 9 Misc. 2d 613, 170 N. Y. S. 2d
373, 376, affd. without op. 5 App. Div. 2d 987, 173 N. Y. S. 2d 992, affd. 5
N. Y. 2d 998, 184 N. Y. S. 2d 859, 157 N. E. 2d 730 (1957).
39 Harper and James, op. cit. supra n. 2 § 7.6 p. 545. Restatement, Torts,
§ 531 p. 71.
40 Restatement, Torts, c. 22, p. 58.
41 Harper and James, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 539.
42 Id. at 548.
43 E.g. Michigan: Aldrich v. Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 117 N. W. 581, 18 L. R.
A. (n. s.) 379 (1908); Rosenberg v. Cyrowski, 227 Mich. 508, 198 N. W. 905,
906 (1924); Kolinski v. Reichstein, 303 Mich. 710, 7 N. W. 2d 117, 119 (1942);
Dykema v. Muskegon Piston Ring Co., 348 Mich. 129, 82 N. W. 2d 467, 471
(1957).
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Duty may grow out of a contract even though such duty is
not assumed by the contracting parties, since, given the con-
tract and the relation, the duty is imposed by law .... 44
Privity.
The concept of a legal duty outside the law of contract which
would give rise to liability for words negligently spoken was
developed in two often cited and now classic "textbook" cases:
Glanzer v. Shepard (1922),45 and International Products Co. v.
Erie R. Co. (1927).46 These were later modified by Ultramares
v. Touche (1931).47 In the light of the development of the action
of negligent misrepresentation, it is necessary to re-examine them
briefly to understand the dual conceptual development. The
cases, never really reconciled, have given rise to two distinct
lines of decision. Those relying on the earlier cases have em-
phasized the personal relationship of the parties. Those relying
on the Ultramares decision have emphasized the nature of the
transaction.
The facts in the Glanzer case involved the performance of
a service as well as the negligent use of words incidental thereto.
Although, as the court stated, the same result could have been
reached by applying the "third party beneficiary rule" of con-
tracts,48 it specifically chose to use tort terms in order to establish
that the duty to use care is imposed by law and not by contract.
"The bounds of duty are enlarged by knowledge of a prospec-
tive use," 49 and, "one who assumes to act, even though gratui-
44 Scholen v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 288 N. Y. 249, 43 N. E. 2d 28,
141 A. L. R. 1273 (1942). Where one party suffers damage by the acts of
another and there is available one remedy in tort and another in contract,
the damaged party may elect to pursue either remedy. Generally: Hender-
son v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 198 Misc. 82, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 840, aff'd.
303 N. Y. 27, 100 N. E. 2d 117, affd. 277 App. Div. 1093, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 256(1950); Matis v. Griscom, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 534 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1946).
45 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922).
46 Supra n. 3.
47 Supra n. 22.
48 Glanzer v. Shepard, supra n. 45 at 277, relying on the doctrine of Law-
rence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859). For cases grounding liability on third
party beneficiary theory, especially where a duty is owing to the public by
statute, see: Vandewater & Lapp v. Sacks Builders, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 677,
186 N. Y. S. 2d 103 (Sup. Ct. App. term 1959). (Erroneous drainage map
filed with county clerk according to statute. Engineers and surveyors, hired
by owner, liable to purchasers.) Allen Properties, Inc., v. Brydle, Sup.,
72 N. Y. S. 2d 554, 559, aff'd. 72 N. Y. S. 2d 293 (App. Div. 1947). (Right to
rely on filed map.)
49 Glanzer V. Shepard, supra n. 45 at 276.
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tously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting care-
fully, if he acts at all." 50
The International decision could not have been based on a
theory of fraud"' or contract 5 2 but rested entirely on a theory of
recovery for words negligently spoken. Often cited for its criti-
cism of the English rule denying liability,5 a the opinion set out
to define the duty relation recognized in the Glanzer case. This
definition involved four elements. It required knowledge or its
equivalent that the information is desired for a serious purpose;
that the person to whom it is directed intends to rely and act
upon it; that if false or erroneous, he will because of it be injured
in person or property. Fourth, it required a relation of the par-
ties, arising out of contract or otherwise, giving rise to a right to
rely and a duty of care.54
Except for the emphasis on the relation of the parties these
elements seem to constitute little more than the negligence rule
of reasonable expectation of harm.55 But "knowledge or its
equivalent" is surely more restrictive than "reasonable expecta-
tion" and the case has served as a guide in restricting the fore-
seeability element. It also reinforced the concept that the duty
is noncontractual in nature and that the question of contributory
negligence is a proper one.50
The Ultramares case has had the most dominating influence
50 Ibid. Acts of omission will result in liability for negligence only where
there is an affirmative duty to speak, but when one assumes to speak he
may be required to speak carefully. In re Perutz' Estate 23 Misc. 2d 229,
199 N. Y. S. 2d 274 (Surrog. Ct. Westchester Co. 1960). (A fiduciary nor-
mally owes a duty of complete disclosure.) Saslow v. Novick, 19 Misc. 2d
475, 712, 191 N. Y. S. 2d 645 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1959). (Duty to disclose
arises only when there is a confidential or a fiduciary relationship.) Dash
v. Jennings, 272 App. Div. 1073, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 881 (1947). (Representation
that stock good investment and corporation solvent. Concealment of mate-
rial facts. Held: No duty to speak, no liability.)
51 International Products v. Erie R. Co., supra n. 3 at 664.
52 Id. at 663.
53 Ibid.
54 Here the court relied on Jaillet v. Cashman, 235 N. Y. 511, 139 N. E. 714
(1923). Dale System, Inc., v. General Teleradio, Inc., supra n. 29 sumna-
rizes the holding in International: "A cause of action exists if the informa-
tion is supplied for a stated purpose, with knowledge that it would be acted
on to the Plaintiff's injury if false and the relationship between the parties
is such that Plaintiff would normally rely on the Defendant for such infor-
mation.... But the scope of the duty falls short of foreseeability of possible
harm to anyone in a group of persons."
55 See Seavey, op. cit. supra n. 13 at 523.
56 International Products v. Erie R. Co., supra n. 3 at 664: "The Defendant
need not benefit."
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in the development of this action. The specific intent of the
opinion is to limit liability not only short of foreseeability but
short of the liability imposed in an action for fraudulent misrep-
resentation.5 7 Indeed, it is an attempt to limit the action to those
in privity:
Liability for (negligent misrepresentation) . . . is bounded
by the contract.5
8
As will be seen, it has not quite achieved this latter goal,
but it has served as a very strong precedent for limiting liability.
The opinion failed to limit liability to those in privity in subse-
quent cases because of its inconsistency on this point. It distin-
guishes the Glanzer case because the "bond (between the par-
ties) was so close as to approach that of privity," since the de-
fendant knew that the information was primarily for the use of
the plaintiff. 59 It distinguishes International because there was
a "prospective" contractual relation and the information re-
quested was exclusively in the possession of the defendant and
therefore in the nature of a warranty.6 It is obvious, from a
reading of the opinion, that Cardozo was not happy with the ef-
fect these decisions had had on subsequent decisions. But he did
not overrule them, probably because he also wrote them!
Cardozo seems to be preoccupied with the limitation of lia-
bility to a workable number of possible plaintiffs. Indeed, he
intimates that, except for this need to limit liability, the elements
of deceit would be sufficient to incorporate an action for negli-
gent misrepresentation and that the cases where duty of care
and contributory negligence would be ignored would be too few
to merit alarm.6 ' But he is determined that somehow we must
make liability for negligence less broad than that for fraud. For
this reason he separates the action and artificially imposes restric-
tions traceable to the nature of the transaction and to the nature
of the damage. This author is much happier with his reasoning
in the two prior cases mentioned. Apparently, so are many of
the New York courts, as we shall see.
57 Ultramares v. Touche, supra n. 22, 174 N. E. at 447.
58 Id. at 448. A New Mexico decision, relying on Ultramares, held that a
duty relation must be found "by reason of a contractual relation or some-
thing in the nature of an equivalent to privity." (Valdez v. Gonzales, supra
n. 21.)
59 Id. at 446.
60 Ibid.
61 Id. at 447, 448.
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Extension of Ultramares
Because the law reflects the customary usages of business,
and because of the effect of the Ultramares decision, not only
the nature of the conduct but the nature of the transaction has
had a profound effect in determining the existence of liability.
The Ultramares decision was actually concerned with a public
accountant who was held liable on a theory of fraud to a third
party relying on his report. An accountant was deemed to be
speaking "as of his own knowledge," simply by the nature of
his calling.6 2 Therefore, on the theory discussed above, if there
is no reasonable basis for the statement, an honest belief in its
truth is no defense. Although Cardozo was unwilling to extend
liability for negligent words "in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class," G3 he was able to
extend the concept of "scienter" to reckless misstatement by a
class of persons who have exclusive knowledge of the facts in
question. In short:
Although public accountants may not be found liable, upon
the theory of ordinary negligence, to parties with whom they
are not in privity, it has been held that they may (be liable)
upon a theory of fraud . . . where (they) . . .have reason
to know (their statement) . . . will be relied upon.
However, in several cases the fraud has been held in-
ferrable from conduct in effect constituting gross negli-
gence.64
In this regard, note the opinion in a recent case:
Heedless and wanton disregard by a CPA of the conse-
quences of an incorrect financial statement will take the
place of a deliberate intention to defraud, and may warrant
holding of the accountant liable to third persons who have
justifiably acted upon the certificate to their injury. 5
Thus, the following fact situations gave rise to an inference
of fraud with resulting liability to third parties. Accountants
were held liable where a large percentage of accounts receivable
were fictitious and would not have been included on the balance
sheet except through the gross negligence of the accountants in
failing to check for their existence. 66 Where, although the state-
62 Id. at 449.
63 Id. at 444.
64 54 A. L. R. 2d 345 (1957).
65 Duro Sportswear v. Cogen, 131 N. Y. S. 2d 20, affd. 285 App. Div. 867,
137 N. Y. S. 2d 829 (1955).
66 Ultramares v. Touche, supra n. 22.
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ment was purported to be made "in their opinion," accountants
were liable for a failure to account for slow collections apparently
uncollectible and there were circumstances showing a conscious
suppression of information.6 7 An accountant understated deficits
through a failure to include bills received but not posted, al-
though he had personal knowledge of the methods of the com-
pany and should have known or knew of them.68 Where an ac-
countant was hired by a borrower to furnish a report to be used
by him for procuring loans and securing credit from plaintiff,
he was liable for fraud where he had knowledge that the books
upon which he based his report had been falsified. 69
On the other hand, it is well established in New York, on
the basis of these same cases, that where there is no indication
of fraudulent intent and no contractual relation, an accountant
will not be liable to third parties for mere negligent misrepresen-
tation. Thus, where failure to mention contingent liabilities is
deemed merely not consistent with good accounting practice the
defendant is not liable.7 0 In short, although cases can be found
where accountants are held liable in fraud, the courts have re-
fused to find a duty relation extending beyond the contracting
parties where the conduct is negligent. Cardozo was concerned
lest attorneys who could not prove fraud find an easy recovery
in negligence. But the effect of his decision has been to so arbi-
trarily restrict the negligence action as to force an expansion of
the action of fraud.
Similar precedents have been established in other fields.7 1
67 State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N. Y. 104, 15 N. E. 2d 416, 120 A. L. R.
1250 (1938). This same case, however, is cited as authority that accountants
are not liable for ordinary negligence in the absence of a contractual rela-
tionship or its equivalent, even though the accountants are aware that the
balance sheet will be used to obtain credit.
68 Duro Sportswear v. Cogen, supra n. 65. (In this case plaintiff's right to
rely was questionable since he was in charge of posting bills and he was
not in privity with defendant.)
69 Mutual Ventures, Inc., v. Barondess, 17 Misc. 2d 483, 186 N. Y. S. 2d 308,
54 A. L. R. 2d 324 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1959). The fact that the petition
alleged that the accountant "certified" rather than "represented" did not
destroy the cause of action because: "any action or conduct, which is suffi-
cient to create on the mind a distinct impression of fact conducive to action,
is a 'representation.'"
70 O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F. 2d 50 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. den. 302 U. S. 758,
58 S. Ct. 364, 82 L. Ed. 586 (1938).
71 As to misrepresentation as to the financial condition or credit of another
brought by one induced to extend credit, generally, see 32 A. L. R. 2d 184
(1953).
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol13/iss2/8
13 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
In the early Jaillet case7 2 the defendant operated a ticker service
for brokers. His relation to the public was held to be the same
as a publisher of a newspaper, that is, no liability outside a
contractual or fiduciary relationship for an unintentional mis-
take. The courts have clearly refused to confuse the action for
negligent misrepresentation with that of libel or injurious false-
hood. Unless there is a provable intent to injure the particular
plaintiff there is no relationship raising a duty of care between
publishers and any member of the general public. Undoubtedly,
this policy flows from reluctance found in Ultramares to extend
liability to an inordinately large class of plaintiffs. Thus, suits
brought on the theory of negligent misrepresentation against
radio broadcasters 73 and newspapers 74 were dismissed for lack
of a duty relation or knowledge that plaintiff would rely. In a
recent case the court held that "the remedy open to plaintiff
through libel is far broader than an action based on negligence"




But the relation of the parties remains the primary consider-
ation in the bulk of the decisions which are not dominated by the
nature of the transaction, and, especially the latter (Glanzer),
where no contractual relationship exists. The very early case of
Doyle v. Chatham & Phoenix Nat. Bank,7 6 decided before the
Ultramares case, did much to reinforce the principles set out in
International. A trustee negligently represented to a prospective
purchaser that certain bonds were adequately secured. It was
essential that the defendant knew the information was requested
for a serious purpose and plaintiff would rely. But further, rely-
ing on International, the court found a "prospective" relation-
ship77 of trustee and cestui que trust between the parties. In ad-
72 Jaillet v. Cashman, supra n. 54.
73 Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 268 App. Div. 707, 53
N. Y. S. 2d 337, rev'd. 296 N. Y. 79, 70 N. E. 2d 401 (1945); Dale System, Inc.
v. General Teleradio, Inc., supra n. 29.
74 Sacco v. Herald Statesman, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 739, 223 N. Y. S. 2d 329(Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 1961); Ciffolillo v. Westchester County Publish-
ers, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 911, 224 N. Y. S. 2d 606 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 1961).
75 Ciffolillo, supra n. 74.
76 253 N. Y. 369, 171 N. E. 574 (1930).
77 A Montana decision, citing International, relies on a similar "prospective
contractual relationship." Sult v. Scandrett, supra n. 21.
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dition, the question of contributory negligence was discussed in
connection with the good faith of plaintiff in relying on the cer-
tification if he was aware of the shady nature of the trustor's
business.
Two recent cases illustrate the principle that knowledge in
defendant's exclusive possession can give rise to a duty of care
not founded on a contractual relationship. In De Atucha v. Manu-
facturers Trust Co. 7 8 plaintiff sold an automobile, the price to be
paid by deposit in defendant bank to plaintiff's account. Plain-
tiff's agent inquired of the bank if the deposit had been made.
Relying on the bank's negligent representation that it had been,
plaintiff transferred title and released security. After finding
(from the nature of the banking business) that defendant knew
that plaintiff would rely for a serious purpose, the court found
that the relation of banker and depositor was sufficient to require
the defendant "in morals and good conscience" 79 to use care in
giving information which was solely in its possession. The plain-
tiff has a right to expect care in these circumstances and, by
giving the information to plaintiff's agent, the bank admitted the
latter's right to it. Contributory negligence was treated, as
usual, as a question of fact.
Facts very similar to those of the Glanzer case were the basis
of liability in Plata American Trading, Inc. v. Lancashire."0 De-
fendant was an experienced weigher hired by the seller to meas-
ure and certify the amount of goods delivered to a carrier for the
benefit of the plaintiff shipper. Defendant knew the purpose of
the certificate and that it would be relied upon in determining
the price paid. Defendant was negligent in not ascertaining
the fact that all the goods which left the seller's tank did not
reach the carrier but were partially diverted into another tank
in the seller's warehouse. He was found to have a duty as an
expert weigher to use care in giving information on which plain-
tiff had a right to rely.
Finally, a 1949 decision s ' draws a very nice distinction be-
78 155 N. Y. S. 2d 537 (Sup. CL N. Y. Co. 1956), affd. 3 App. Div. 2d 902, 163
N. Y. S. 2d 402 (1957).
79 The court was here quoting the language used in International, supra
n. 3 at 664.
80 29 Misc. 2d 246, 214 N. Y. S. 2d 43 (1957).
81 Champion Construction & Engineering Co. v. Bush Terminal Building
Co., 275 App. Div. 1055, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 242 (1949).
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tween the liability for fraud and that for negligence. Defendant
owner represented to a subcontractor (plaintiff) that he had
procured a bond, in accordance with his contract with the gen-
eral contractor, for payment by the general contractor of its
obligations to the owner and subcontractors. Plaintiff relied by
furnishing labor and materials. The plaintiff was allowed to re-
cover on the theory of fraud, since it was found that the defend-
ant knew his statement was false. But, the court held, he could
not recover if the defendant was merely negligent in failing to
obtain the bond from the general contractor because he had no
statutory or contractual duty owing to the plaintiff to insist on
a bond or to inspect the bond furnished by the general con-
tractor.82
Conclusion
Although the New York law is somewhat ambiguous, due
to Judge Cardozo's change of heart in the Ultramares decision,
it is still the leading jurisdiction in defining the differences be-
tween negligent and intentional misrepresentation. Other juris-
dictions would do well to take a second look at the confusion in
their own decisions and try to arrive at a clear understanding of
the difference between a negative prohibition against intentional
infliction of harm and an affirmative duty to protect the interests
of another.
82 Intent not to perform a promise may be fraudulent: Channel Master
Corp. v. Aluminum Ltd. Sales, Inc., 4 N. Y. 2d 403, 176 N. Y. S. 2d 259, 151
N. E. 2d 833 (1958).
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